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Abstract. In this paper we propose two new generic attacks on the Rank Syndrome Decoding (RSD)
problem Let C be a random [n, k] rank code over GF (qm) and let y = x + e be a received word such
that x ∈ C and the Rank(e) = r. The first attack is combinatorial and permits to recover an error e
of rank weight r in min(O((n − k)3m3qr⌊
km
n
⌋, O((n − k)3m3q(r−1)⌊
(k+1)m
n
⌋)) operations on GF (q). This
attack dramatically improves on previous attack by introducing the length n of the code in the exponent
of the complexity, which was not the case in previous generic attacks. which can be considered The second
attack is based on a algebraic attacks: based on the theory of q-polynomials introduced by Ore we propose
a new algebraic setting for the RSD problem that permits to consider equations and unknowns in the
extension field GF (qm) rather than in GF (q) as it is usually the case. We consider two approaches to
solve the problem in this new setting. Linearization technics show that if n ≥ (k + 1)(r + 1)− 1 the RSD
problem can be solved in polynomial time, more generally we prove that if ⌈ (r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r
⌉ ≤ k, the
problem can be solved with an average complexity O(r3k3qr⌈
(r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r
⌉). We also consider solving
with Gröbner bases for which which we discuss theoretical complexity, we also consider consider hybrid
solving with Gröbner bases on practical parameters. As an example of application we use our new attacks
on all proposed recent cryptosystems which reparation the GPT cryptosystem, we break all examples of
published proposed parameters, some parameters are broken in less than 1 s in certain cases.
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1 Introduction
There exist several alternative problems to classical cryptography based on number theory: besides
lattice based cryptography and multivariate cryptography, code-based cryptography has been recently
the object of papers [14,23,1,4] considering in details the practical complexity of the syndrome decoding
problem for random codes for the Hamming metric. The rank metric for coding theory was introduced
by Gabidulin in 1985 in [15] and he proposed a family of codes, the Gabidulin codes, analogous
to Reed-Solomon codes in Hamming metric, which can be decoded in polynomial time. The Rank
Syndrome Decoding (RSD) problem is the analagous for rank metric of the Syndrome Decoding
problem for Hamming distance. Concerning cryptography, Gabidulin and al. proposed a few years
later in [18] a cryptosystem (GPT) analogous to the McEliece cryptosystem but for rank metric. One
of the advantage of rank metric is that the complexity of the best known attacks for solving the
RSD problem have an exponential complexity which is quadratic in the parameters of the system.
For C a [n, k] code over GF (qm) that one wants to decode for an error of rank r, the 1996 attack by
Chabaud and Stern [7] has an exponential term in q(m−r)(r−1) and the 2003 attack by Ourivski and
Johansson [25] has an exponential term in q(k+1)(r−1). It means that in practice very high security in
280 can potentially be obtained with a public key of only a few thousands bits for the generic RSD
problem, when for Hamming distance for instance, relying on the generic Syndrome Decoding (SD)
problem means considering matrices of at least several hundred thousands bits. Because of the strong
structure of Gabidulin codes, the GPT cryptosystem has been the object of several structural attacks
over the years and several variations [17] for hiding the structure of the Gabidulin codes, like the Rank
Reducible codes, have been proposed, with always public keys size of order 10.000 bits. Besides the
GPT system, Faure and Loidreau [13] proposed a cryptosystem also relying on the Gabidulin codes but
different from the GPT approach. At last public key zero-knowledge authentication schemes relying
directly on random instances of RSD and with very small public keys have been proposed like [8] or
very recently [19].
In 2005 Overbeck proposed a new structural attack [26,27] (see also the long version in J. of Crypto
[28]), which permits to recover the structure of Gabidulin codes when hidden in different forms. His
attack broke indeed all proposed parameters (at that time) of cryptosystems based on hiding the
Gabidulin codes. A few years later, new parameters have been proposed [21,29] which resist the attack
by Overbeck.
Meanwhile besides the Overbeck attack which is a structural attack only related to Gabidulin codes,
the complexity of the generic RSD problem has not evolved for almost 10 years. In particular when
looking at the exponential complexity of [7] and [25], it is striking that the exponential does not depend
on the length the code. Besides these combinatorial attacks, an algebraic approach was also proposed
in [20] but with limited results as soon as r was greater than 2 or 3, eventually the case n = m is
indirectly considered in [10]. Overall the RSD problem appears to be a cryptographic problem with a
strong potential which seems under exploited.
Our contribution: In this paper we consider the complexity of solving the generic RSD problem we
propose two new approaches, the first approach is combinatorial and generalizes a particular Hamming
distance attack based on the error support in a rank metric context. Our attack can be seen as a
generalization of both [7] and [25] and permits to include the length of the code in the exponential
term of the complexity. For the second approach we introduce a new algebraic setting for solving
the RSD problem, our setting relies on q-polynomials (or linearized polynomials) introduced by Ore
and minimize the number of unknowns by giving an algebraic setting in the extension field GF (qm)
rather than in GF (q) as it is the case in general. We consider several ways to solve the problem in
this setting: an hybrid generalization approach and a, hybrid solving with Gröbner bases. We apply
our attack and break all reparation of the GPT cryptosystem proposed after the Overbeck attack. In
practice for considered parameters algebraic attacks based on the new annulator polynomial setting
give the best results.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls basic facts on rank codes , Section 3 explains the
first attack based on error support, Section 4 introduces the new algebraic setting based on annulator
polynomials, Section 5 propose a solving of the setting with linearization, Section 6 considers solving
with Gröbner basis and at last Section 7 deals with application of the attacks to specific cryptosystems
parameters.
2 Background on rank metric, rank codes and algebraic systems
2.1 Definitions and notation
Notation :
Let q be a power of a prime p, m an integer and let Vn be a n dimensional vector space over the finite
field GF(qm). Let β = (β1, . . . , βm) be a basis of GF(q
m) over GF(q).
Let Fi be the map from GF(q
m) to GF(q) where Fi(x) is the i-th coordinate of x in the basis β.
To any v = (v1, . . . , vn) in Vn we associate the matrix v ∈ Mm,n(GF(q)) in which vi,j = Fi(vj).
The rank weight of a vector v can be defined as the rank of the associated matrix v. If we name this
value rank(v) we can have a distance between two vectors x, y using the formula rd(x, y) = rank(x−y).
2.2 Codes for the rank distance
We refer to [22] for more details on codes for the rank distance.
A rank code C of length n and dimension k over GF(qm) is a subspace of dimension k of GF(qm)
embedded with the ran metric. The minimum rank distance of the code C is the minimum rank of
non-zero vectors of the code.
2.3 Rank distance and cryptography
The Syndrome Decoding problem for Hamming distance is written as:
Syndrome Decoding problem (SD)
Let H be a ((n−k)×n) matrix over GF(qm) with k ≤ n, i ∈ GF(qm)k and ω an integer. The problem
is to find s such that wt(s) ≤ ω and Hst = i where wt denotes the Hamming weight.
The problem was proven NP-hard in [3] and is considered hard in general, especially when the matrix
H is chosen at random. The best known algorithms for solving this problem are all exponential in ω,
a recent survey on this complexity can be found in [14].
The previous problem can be naturally extended to the rank distance:
Rank Syndrome Decoding problem (RSD) Let H be a ((n − k)× n) matrix over GF(qm) with
k ≤ n, i ∈ GF(qm)k and r an integer. The problem is to find s such that rank(s) = r and Hst = i.
In that case it is not proven that the problem is NP-hard, but the relation with the Hamming case and
the fact that the best known algorithms are all exponential makes this problem difficult in practice
and the problem is generally believed to be hard.
There are two main approaches to this problem in the case of the rank matrix : Chabaud and Stern
proposed an algorithm to solve the problem in O((nr+m)3q(m−r)(r−1))(see [7]) Ourivski and Johannson
proposed two algorithms, the first one improves the polynomial part of the basis enumeration approach
of [7] and is in O((k + r)3q(m−r)(r−1)+2), the second uses a coordinates enumeration and is in O((k +
r)3r3q(r−1)(k+1))(see [25]).
2.4 Polynomial solving
Some attacks proposed here consist to reduce the RSD problem to solving a polynomial system. Let
us, now, introduce the problem of solving polynomial systems:
Problem: polynomial system solving (PoSSo):
Input: f1(x1, · · · , xu), · · · , ft(x1, · · · , xu) polynomial over K[x1, · · · , xu] where K is a field. Goal:
Find all z = (z1, · · · , zu) ∈ K
u such that f1(z) = · · · = fn(z) = 0.
We will use two main methods to solve this problem: linearization (when we have enough equations)
and Gröbner bases (this a general approach). It is well known that PoSSo problem is NP-hard even if all
the fi are of degree 2 (in this case the problem is calledMQ for multivariate quadratic). Gröbner basis
is a systematic tool to solve the PoSSo problem. When such a system has a finite number of solutions,
it is said to be zero-dimensional. We will only consider zero-dimensional systems here since the roots
coordinates are in a finite field and the field equations on each variable form a zero-dimensional system
by itself.
3 Error support attack
3.1 Background on information set decoding for Hamming distance
The best algorithms for decoding general random codes for Hamming distance is the information set
decoding approach [14]. This method can be considered in two different ways. Consider for instance
G a generator matrix of a [n, k] (binary) code and let H a parity check matrix of G.
The first original approach starts from the received word y = xG + e and consists in guessing a set
of k coordinates of y with no error (an information set), once such a set is found with a probability
(n−tk )
(nk)
, a linear inversion of a k × k matrix permits to recover x. This is what is done in some sens for
rank codes by Ourivski and Johansson in [25].
Another approach for Hamming distance consists in starting from the syndrome H.yt of length n− k
of the received vector. The basic idea of the decoding algorithm consists in guessing a set of n − k
coordinates which contains the support of the error e, it can be obtained with probability
( n−tn−k−t)
( nn−k)
.
Then since one gets n − k equations from the syndrome equations and a set of n − k coordinates
containing the error support, it is possible to recover the error e by a (n−k)× (n−k) matrix inversion
from the syndrom of the message.
It turns out that because of the properties of binomial coefficients, the two previous probabilities are
equal and hence lead to the same exponential complexity for these two approaches (only in their simple
form though - see recent improvements [14,23,1,4]). Meanwhile one can remark that, although these
attack are both considered as ’information set decoding’, the second approach is not really connected
with the notion of information set, but rather with the notion of error support.
We want to generalize the latter error support approach in the case of rank codes. We will see that at the
difference of Hamming distance, for rank distance these two approaches lead to different exponential
complexities and that the error support approach leads in general to a better complexity than the
information set approach (corresponding to the Ourivski-Johansson approach).
3.2 General idea
Let C be a [n, k] random code over GF (qm) with generator matrix G of size k × n and suppose
one receives y = c + e for c ∈ C and rank(e) = r, in particular for e = (e1, · · · , en) there exists a
subspace E of dimension r which contains all the errors coordinates ei. If one denotes by (E1, · · · , Er)
a basis of E, one gets that: ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists eij ∈ GF (q)(1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ r) such that
ei =
∑r
j=1 eijEj.
Let now H be a matrix of the dual code of C, then one gets
H.et = H.yt. (1)
In a context of rank distance the notion of support corresponds to the notion of error space E since E
contains all possible coordinates errors. Notice that for rank distance the support is a notion related to
value of the coordinate errors ei, when for Hamming distance the notion concerns a set of coordinates.
Now we want to guess a support E′ which contains the support E; an important point is the fact
that for such a support E′ it has to be possible to recover the error e by solving a linear system (as
for Hamming distance). In the case of rank distance, we have the rank syndrome equations. There
are n− k equations over the extension field GF (qm) given by the rank syndrome, when writing these
equations over the small field GF (q) we get (n − k)m equations on the small field. Now suppose we
know E′ of dimension r′ which contains E, then each error coordinate ei can be written as an element
of E′. If we denote by (E′1, · · · , E
′
r) a basis of E
′ in GF (qm) over GF (q), then there exist e′ij ∈ GF (q)
such that:
∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ei =
r∑
j=1
e′ijE
′
j .
Since E′ is fixed (and hence the E′i), it gives r
′.n unknowns (the e′ij) in GF (q) and hence it is possible
to recover the errors coordinates ei by solving a linear system as long as r
′n ≤ (n− k)m.
3.3 Error support attack
If one also uses the fact that there is a rank code structure, the previous idea permits to prove the
following proposition:
Proposition 1. Let C be a [n, k] random code over GF (qm) with generator matrix G of size k × n
and suppose one receives y = c+e for c ∈ C and rank(e) = r. Then one can recover c with an average
complexity: min(O((n− k)3m3qr⌊
km
n
⌋, O((n − k)3m3q(r−1)⌊
(k+1)m
n
⌋)).
Proof. Let C be a [n, k] random code over GF (qm) with generator matrix G of size k×n and suppose
one receives y = c+ e for c ∈ C and rank(e) = r, in particular there exists a subspace E of dimension
r which contains all the errors coordinates ei. Let now H be a matrix of the dual code of C, then one
gets H.et = H.yt. Suppose now one knows a subspace E′ of dimension r′ which contains E, then for
all ei(1 ≤ i ≤ n), if we denote by E
′
1, · · · , Er′ a basis of E
′, there exist e′ij ∈ GF (q) such that:
ei =
r∑
j=1
e′ijE
′
j .
Equation (1) gives (n− k)m equations over the small field, the number of unknowns derived from the
e′ij is r
′n. Hence it is possible to recover the e′ij (and therefore the ei) y solving a linear system, as
long as
r′n ≤ (n− k)m,
and hence :
r′ ≤ ⌊
(n− k)m
n
⌋
(for ⌊a⌋: floor of a (the integer part of a)).
Let now be E′ a subspace of dimension r′ over GF (q) of GF (qm) , supposing that everything is random
the probability that E of dimension r is included in E′ of dimension r′ (for r′ ≥ r) is q−(m−r
′)r. Indeed
consider a basis of E, one gets E ⊂ E′ if and only any element of a given basis of E is included in E′.
Since any vector of a basis of E has a probability q
r
qm
= q−(m−r
′) to be in E′ (the number of element
of E′ divided by the number element in GF (qm)), the probability that E ⊂ E′ is therefore q−(m−r
′)r.
Hence if one takes r′ = ⌊ (n−k)m
n
⌋ = ⌊m− km
n
⌋ one gets a probability that E is included in a random
space E′ of dimension r′, which is q−(m−r
′)r = q−r⌊
km
n
⌋. Hence if one also consider the complexity of
the matrix inversion one gets the first proposed complexity of the proposition.
Now it is also possible to use the code structure and decrease the value of r by one, when increasing
the value of k by one in the exponential coefficient, it is an interesting point since in practice, r is in
general small and k is bigger than r.
The idea works as follows: one starts again, from the equation y = xG + e, we introduce a new
(k+1)×n matrix G′ obtained from G by adding a last row y. Now e belongs to the code C ′ generated
by G′, but more generally since C ′ is a code over GF (qm), for any α ∈ GF (qm), the vector αe is also
in G′. The idea now is to fix a special value of α which will fix an element of the searched error space,
it will decrease by 1 the number of basis element which are to be included in E′. Then once the space
αE is recovered, one recovers the α and the original E.
To go in more detail on this idea: we suppose without loss of generality that e1 6= 0, if one considers
the subspace e−11 E it has still dimension r but contains the vector 1. One can apply the same method
that previously but this time the code has dimension k + 1 and one knows an element of E. The
number of syndrome equations over GF (q) is (n − k − 1)m. And hence the dimension r′ of E′ must
satisfy: r′ ≤ ⌊ (n−k−1)m
n
⌋. Since one knows that 1 ∈ E, one just need that the remaining r− 1 elements
of a basis of E are also in E′, which gives a probability q−(r−1)⌊
(k+1)m
n
⌋. Once we recover e−11 E, taking
e−11 as unknown in syndrome equations permits to recover it easily at almost no cost. Overall if one
adds the polynomial complexity one gets the second complexity of the proposition.
⊓⊔
Remark 1: Comparison with previous attacks
In term of support, the basis enumeration attack corresponds to enumerate all possible supports of
the error, it is the equivalent in Hamming distance, to enumerate all combination of error but with
exact weight: the weight of the error. Such an approach does not take in account the fact that one
knows (n− k) linear equations in the extension field. Hence our attack can be seen as a combinatorial
generalization of this point a view, in particular our attack is always better in term of exponential
complexity. Our attack is also better in term of exponent complexity than [25] as soon as n ≥ m,
which is often the case in proposed parameters. Overall our attack can be seen as a generalization of
the previous attacks [7].
remark 2: False solutions
There is the theoretical possibility that false solutions appear in the solving of the linear system, now
since we consider the system as random, this case does not happen on the average. In practice with a
strong probability we find only one solution to the system: the searched.
4 Annulator polynomial setting
We now consider a new algebraic setting, in order to do so we need to recall basic facts on q-polynomials.
4.1 Background on q-polynomials and annulator polynomials
We first recall some definitions on q-polynomials introduced by Ore in [24].
Definition 1. A q-polynomial of q-degree r in GF (qm) is a polynomial of the form:
P (x) =
r∑
i=0
pix
qi , for pr 6= 0.
One can remark that since the application x → xq is the Frobenius of GF (qm)/GF (q), any q-
polynomial of q-degree r over GF (qm) can be seen as a linear application over GF (qm) considered as
a vector space of dimension m over GF (q).
In particular q-polynomials satisfy:
∀x, y ∈ GF (qm),∀α, β ∈ GF (q), P (αx+ βy) = αP (x) + βP (y).
In particular if a and b are roots of a q-polynomial P , then P (a) = P (b) = 0 = P (a+ b), and clearly
the roots of a q-polynomial of q-degree r form a vector space over GF (q) of dimension at most r.
The set of q-polynomials in GF (qm) has very nice properties, in particular it has a structure of non-
commutative ring when it is embedded with the two following operations:
Addition : (P +Q)(x) = P (x) +Q(x).
Composition : (PoQ)(x) = P (Q(x)).
In [24], Ore describes how any r-dimensional subspace over GF (q) in GF (qm) can be characterized as
the set of root of a q-polynomial of q-degree r. He gives simple explicit polynomial constructions which
permit in particular to construct such a polynomial from a given subspace. He proves the following
proposition that we will use to define our algebraic setting:
Proposition 41 (Ore) For any subspace E of GF (qm) over GF (q) of dimension r there exists a
unique monic q-polynomial P of q-degree r, such that:
∀z ∈ E, P (z) = 0.
In the following an annulator polynomial will be a q-polynomial which zeros are a given subspace of
GF (qm). Such a polynomial annulates in some sense the element of a given subspace of GF (qm).
4.2 A new algebraic setting for solving the rank decoding problem based on the
annulator polynomial
Let C be a [n, k] random code over GF (qm) with generator matrix G of size k × n. We denote by
Gi the i
th rows of G and by gij the elements of G. Suppose one receives y = c + e for x ∈ C and
rank(e) = r. Traditional algebraic settings for solving the rank distance problem [20] use in general
as unknowns : r unknowns in GF (qm) for a basis of E, k unknowns in GF (qm) for the ci and n × r
unknowns in GF (q) for the coordinates of the ei in E. We now describe a new algebraic setting which
has only k + r unknowns in GF (qm).
The important point of this setting is given by the fact that the Annulator polynomial of Proposition
41 permits to characterize in an optimal way the notion that a matrix has a given rank, since all
subspaces of rank r can be described as the set set of roots of a q-polynomials of q-degree r, hence
simply by the r coefficients in GF (qm) of the q-polynomial.
Let c =
∑k
i=1 ciGi, e = (e1, · · · , en) and y = (y1, · · · , yn). Since e has rank r, the subspace E generated
by the ei has dimension r. By Proposition 41 there exists a unique monic annulator q-polynomial
P (x) =
∑r
i=0 pix
qi with pr = 1 such that ∀z ∈ E, P (z) = 0. Hence we obtain:
∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, P (yj −
k∑
i=1
cigij) = P (ej) = 0,
which gives n equations in the k + r unknowns: ci(1 ≤ i ≤ k) and pj(0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1).
This new setting has unknowns has less unknowns than previous settings since all unknowns are in
GF (qm), the general monomials of the system are of the form pjc
qj
i : they are quadratic terms in ci
and pj, meanwhile the degree of the terms in ci are exponential in q
r. Hence on one side we decrease
the number of unknowns and on the other side we increase the degree of the equations.
We are now interested by the way to solve equations in this new setting, we will consider two ways:
linearization and solving with Gröbner basis:
5 Solving by linearization
5.1 Basic approach
A basic approach consists in counting the number of different monomials in the ci and the pj and
independent unknowns and the number of equations, in our setting, although the degree of equation
is very high it turns out that the equations are also very sparse so that there a not so many different
monomials, it is possible to obtain the following result:
Proposition 2. Let C be a [n, k] random code over GF (qm) with generator matrix G of size k × n
and suppose one receives y = c+ e for c ∈ C and rank(e) = r. If n ≥ (r+1)(k+1)− 1 the complexity
of solving the rank decoding problem is polynomial in ((r + 1)(k + 1)− 1)3 operations in GF (qm).
Proof. We saw in previous section how the new setting could be described: Let c =
∑k
i=1 ciGi, e =
(e1, · · · , en) and y = (y1, · · · , yn). Since e has rank r, the subspace E generated by the ei has dimension
r. By Proposition 41 there exists a unique monic annulator q-polynomial P (x) =
∑r
i=0 pix
qi with
pr = 1 such that ∀z ∈ E, P (z) = 0. Hence we obtain:
∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, P (yj −
k∑
i=1
cigij) = P (ej) = 0, (2)
which gives n equations in the k + r unknowns: ci(1 ≤ i ≤ k) and pj(0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1). Now the system
we obtain is quadratic in the unknowns ci and pi. Such a non linear system can be solved through
Gröbner basis, but it is also possible to solve by linearization, indeed in this case by linearization we
obtain (r + 1)(k + 1)− 1 terms:
- k.r terms of the form : pjc
qj
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1
- k terms of the form: cq
r
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k (corresponding to the term pr = 1).
- r terms of the form : pj for 0 ≤ j ≤ pr−1 (corresponding to the scalar coordinates of y)
Hence overall (r+1)(k +1)− 1 linearized terms. In the case where the number of equations n satisfy
n ≥ (r+1)(k+1)− 1, the problem can hence be solved on the average by solving a linear system over
GF (qm) with (r + 1)(k + 1)− 1 unknowns.
⊓⊔
5.2 An hybrid advanced approach
We saw how it was possible depending on conditions on n, k and r to solve directly the problem, now
what happens if such a condition is not fulfilled. We saw that in basic linearization of previous section
that the number of unknowns was quadratic in r and k. It is possible to decrease this number by
guessing an error. Suppose indeed that an error ej is zero, recall that:
∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, yj =
k∑
i=1
cigij + ej ,
then if ej = 0 one obtains a linear equation in the ci, which permits to substitute one of the ci by a
linear combination of the others in all rows equations of the code.
In particular it means if one can find an error ej = 0, then one can decrease the number of ci by one
and hence decrease the number of unknowns in the linearization by (r+1) terms. Now since the error
ei ∈ E of dimension r, for random ei the probability that ei = 0 is q
−r.
This idea is precised in :
Proposition 3. Let C be a [n, k] random code over GF (qm) with generator matrix G of size k × n
and suppose one receives y = c + e for c ∈ C and rank(e) = r. If there exists an integer t ≤ k such
that n− t ≥ (r+1)(k+1− t)− 1 then complexity of solving the rank decoding problem has an average
complexity bounded above by O((nkt+ r3k3)qrt) operations in GF (qm).
Proof. Our algebraic setting gives n equations in ci and pj. Suppose that we know that for a given
equation, the error ej is zero, then we obtain a linear equation (
∑k
i=1 cigij) with only unknowns the
ci. Suppose that c1 (for instance) is written in terms of the others cj(cj 6= 1), then substituting c1 by
a linear equation in the cj(cj 6= 1), in all the n equations given by the relation y = cG+ e gives a new
system of equations, with n− 1 linear equations without c1 and one equation that is kept aside with
c1. Since the error rank is still the same, one knows that the annulator polynomial is still an annulator
polynomial since the remaining errors ej are the same. Hence one can still use equation (2) of the
previous section, but this time the number of unknowns ci has decreased by one. We hence obtain a
new linearized system of equations with only (r + 1)(k + 1) − 1 − (r + 1) terms. Now since we have
used an equation to describe c1 from the ci we have one equation less (which contain terms with c1)
and hence n− 1 independent equations without c1.
We hence saw how to it was possible to decrease the number of linearized terms when a zero error ej
was known. Now all rows of the code permits to derive linear equations:
∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, yi =
k∑
j=1
cjgij + ei.
If one considers these n equations and consider new equations obtained by additions of multiplication
of these equations by a random non-zero element of GF (q), the obtained equations are still linear
in cj and since multiplication by an element of GF (q) does not change the error support, the error
obtained in the new equation can be considered as a random random element of E. Therefore we can
deduce that the probability to obtain a zero error in the linear combination of these equations is 1
qr
since there are only qr possible errors.
Repeating the process t times permits each time to decrease the number of linearized terms by r + 1
and reduces the number of equations to be used (ie: without the substituted ci) by 1, with a probability
of success of 1
qrt
. The complexity of the attack has a probability part in qrt and a polynomial part.
The polynomial part consists in searching new equations with error zero, this part is negligible since
one can use a method where one modifies very few equations for each new trial. Once a potential zero
is found, after finding i zeros, one has to write the cj in terms of cl for 1 ≤ l ≤ j− 1, and then modify
the terms of each cl with the terms coming from ck. After t trials the cost is hence
∑t
i=1(k− i)(n− i).
Then the last part is the solving of a linear system in GF (qm) with (r + 1)(k + 1− t)− 1 unknowns.
The overall polynomial cost is hence
∑t
i=1(k−i)(n−i)+((r+1)(k+1−t)−1)
3 operations in GF (qm).
The first term can be bounded above by nkt and the second by (r+1)3(k+1)3, which gives the result.
⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Let C be a [n, k] random code over GF (qm), suppose one receives y = c + e for c ∈
C and rank(e) = r. Then if ⌈ (r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r
⌉ ≤ k, the error e can be recovered with complexity
O(r3k3qr⌈
(r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r
⌉).
Proof. We apply the previous proposition: the condition t ≤ k such that n− t ≥ (r+1)(k+1− t)− 1
gives t = ⌈ (r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r
⌉. In the complexity since in general for practical parameters t << n we
neglect the part in nkt. ⊓⊔
6 Solving with Gröbner basis
6.1 Solving polynomial systems: Gröbner basis approach
The notion of Gröbner basis is linked to the one of monomial term ordering. A monomial order is
an order on monomials which is compatible with the product in order to have a pseudo-division with
respect to such an order. Roughly speaking, a Gröbner basis G = {g1, · · · , gs} of the ideal generated
by a set of polynomials f1, · · · , fn is a family such that, for each h ∈ K[x1, · · · , xu], then remainder of
the pseudo-division of h with respect to G is 0 if and only if h lies in the ideal (f1, · · · , fn).
The lexicographical orders are particularly interesting since the shape of the Gröbner basis for such
an order is the following:
g1(x1), g2,1(x1, x2), · · · , g2,l2(x1, x2), . . . , gu,1(x1, · · · , xu), · · · , gu,lu(x1, · · · , xu)
This structure allows to solve the original system. It was the initial motivation to the research of
more efficient algorithms to compute Gröbner bases. Generally, computing a Gröbner basis for a
lexicographical order is harder than computing one for graded ordering. But one you know a Gröbner
basis for a graded order you can use the FGLM algorithm to have one for lexicographical order or use
solver that use directly the structure of the pseudo-division by Gröbner basis with respect to graded
order.
The more efficient algorithm to compute Gröbner basis is the F5 algorithm of Faugère [9], but for
experiments realized in this work had been made using the F4 algorithm in MAGMA [6]. Here, we give
complexity result using the F5 algorithm even if we use the F4 algorithm since the use of F5 algorithm
has been carefully studied for cryptography. An important quantity for Gröbner basis computation of
a ideal is the regularity of the generating system, denoted dreg, defining the ideal. The number dreg is
the biggest degree reach in the Gröbner basis computation by the F5 algorithm. In [12], the authors
give a way to bound the complexity of the algorithm with respect to the regularity of the system:
Proposition 4. The complexity of computing Gröbner basis of a zero-dimensional system of t equa-
tions in u variables using the F5 algorithm is:
O
(
n ∗
(
u+ dreg − 1
dreg
)ω)
where dreg is the degree of regularity of the system and 2 ≤ ω ≤ 3 is the linear algebra constant.
6.2 Gröbner bases for RSD
We will now use this technical background to study the original system, denoting p = (p0, · · · , pr−1)
and c = (c1, .., ck):
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, li(p, c) =
r∑
a=0

(payqa)−

 k∑
j=0
pac
qa
j g
qa
i,j



 . (1)
Complexity issues of our method: The use of Gröbner bases is very important when n <
(r + 1)(k + 1) − 1 , possibly combined with guessing of some variables for an hybrid approach. Here,
instead of (r+1)(k+1) variables of the linear attack, we have r(k+1) variables since we can assume
that the polynomial is unitary (pr=1).
The system is sparse and has a suitable structure. Even if it has a very algebraic definition, the notion
of regularity is actually related to the one of randomness. The system is a semi-regular system. To
see this, first remark that this ideal (l1, · · · , ln) is proper since the system always has a solution. The
other property to check is a consequence that the system inherits of the randomness of the underling
code. The leading term of each li is provided by the term
r∑
a=0
k∑
j=0
pac
qa
j g
qa
i,j and so the leading term is
issue of
k∑
j=0
cq
r
j g
qr
i,j. This is a random homogeneous system of degree q
r since the coefficients come from
the random matrix G. This insure us the good “random” behavior of the system.
We denote by Md(u) the set of monomial of degree d in u variables, we have #Md(u) =
(
u+d−1
d
)
.
Following [9], the complexity to compute a Gröbner basis of an ideal of degree if regularity dreg in a
ring of polynomial of u variables with the F5 algorithm is O
((
#Mdreg(u)
)ω)
.
Remark that all the equations have degree qr +1 in a way that dreg is the first non positive coefficient
of
(1−zq
r+1)
rk
(1−z)n . Since: (
1− zq
r+1
)
(1− z)
=
qr∑
i=0
zi,
we have that dreg is the first non positive coefficient of:(
qr∑
i=0
zi
)
(1− z)kr−n .
We obtain a complexity in O
(
n
((k+1)r+dreg
dreg
))
. We used the package describe in [5] to compute the
regularity of some problems (and one can deduce a close formula for dreg from the above computa-
tion). The sparseness of the system make the theoretical complexity evaluation to far from practical
achievement. For instance, for the case where q = 224, k = 12, r = 6 (i.e. equations have degree 26+1)
and n = 64, we have a regularity of 200 and a complexity bound by 2152 ! But the running time
to solve using F4 in MAGMA is only few hours (and we can take advantage of the hybrid approach
in order to improve the approach). It appears, experimentally, that the equations appearing in the
computations are very very sparse and remain sparse. When the number of equations decrease, the
algorithm destroy fast the sparse structure. So, the theoretical bound has generally no meaning by
itself, but it reveals some structural properties of the formulation. Experimentally, the running time of
the algorithm behaves as if we replace the degrees of the equations by their q-degree (here the degree
is qr and the q-degree is r). In the previous example, instead of a complexity of 2152 with the degree,
the complexity with q-degree is 255 and the algorithm effectively run within few hours. This remark
is always valid in example as long as n > r(k + 1). This give a range of parameters for which the
Gröbner bases approach improve the linearization. Furthermore, the hybrid approach extend naturally
the advance approach as we will see below.
Comparison with other approaches: Other approaches, introduced in the context of cryptanalysis
of systems based on MinRank problem can be extended to the RSD problem and reduce the considered
problems to PoSSo problem just as we did in the previous paragraphs. We will show that our approach
is of particular interest compare to those ones. The two methods has in common to get back to the linear
algebra formulation and so, they work on the field GF (q). We do not introduce here MinRank problem,
we only adapt the attack to RSD. To do this, we use the reduction introduced in [10] to transform in
poly-time a rank decoding problem to a MinRank problem. We also use the bounds given in [10] since,
those authors give finer result in [12] and [11], but algorithm in [12] works only for square matrices
(which is generally not true in our cases) and in [11] the algorithm is probabilistic and the complexity
is not improved drastically. Using the reduction of [10], we reduce a RSD problem on GF (qm) with
parameters k for the dimension of the code, n for it size and r for the error rank to a MinRang problem
of parameters m (number of rows of the matrices), n (number of column of the matrices), r (rank)
and km (number of matrices). The method was develop only for square matrices, but it is possible
to extend it to rectangular matrices. Using the theoretical bound of [12], the Kipnis-Shamir approach
apply to a RSD problem of parameters n, k, r leads, when the generated MinRank problem is square,
to an algorithm with complexity O
((
k∗m+r(n−r)+dreg
dreg
)ω)
(ω still denotes the linear algebra constant)
and with dreg ≤ 1+min{k∗m, (n−r)r}). Here, the number of variables depend of n andm in contrary
to our approach and is the bound seem also very pessimistic. Finally, the minors approach apply to a
RSD problem of parameters n, k, r needs O
((
k∗m+r(n−r)+1
r(n−r)+1
))
operations over GF (q) with some more
restrictive conditions. So, even if it is possible to give bounds for this approach, the number of variable
highly depend on the dimension m of the field GF (qm) over GF (q) and of the number of equation
n in the exponent. Our approach, staying in GF (qm), avoid the parameter m in the combinatorial
factor (it is on the constant for the complexity of the basic operations on GF (qm)). Furthermore, for
our approach, the number of equation n does not appear in the combinatorial factor, but only on the
regularity making regularity decrease when n rises.
6.3 Hybrid approach
Just as for the advance linearization attack, it is possible to make an hybrid approach making some
guess on the values of some variables ci. Since the number of variables for the Gröbner bases approach
is (k + 1) ∗ r each time we find a ci, we reduce the number of variables of r. Furthermore, we reduce
the number of variable without decreasing the number of equation a lot. It is to say that making guess
on several variables improve the ratio of the number of equation over the number of variables. It is
known that it is easier to compute an Gröbner basis of a very over-constrained non-coherent systems.
We use this in order to define an heuristic: try to guess sufficiently many ci to be able to check fast
that the generated system is not coherent. There is tradeoff between the number t of ci we try to
guess (it gives a qt factor to the complexity and decrease the probability of success) and the speed of
checking if the system is not coherent.
7 Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystems
7.1 The GPT rank-based cryptosystem
The GPT cryptosystem is similar to the McELiece cryptosystem but works for rank distance. The
Gabidulin codes are the equivalent of the Reed-Solomon codes for rank metric. The main problem
in the cryptosystem consists in finding a way to hide the decoding matrix. For Hamming distance it
is done through a permutation matrix. In the case of Gabidulin codes, several approaches have been
proposed by adding words of small rank, by adding a scrambling matrix, introducing a new class of
codes: the Rank reducible codes etc... All these systems lead to interesting parameters. There are two
ways to attack such systems: a first way is structural and the attacker tries to recover the mask (or
the hiding procedure) from the public key, based on the structural properties of the Gabidulin codes.
In 2005 Overbeck [26] proposed a structural attack which broke many proposed parameters. After this
attack some new parameters have been proposed which resist to this attack. We show in the following
that these parameters are not secure either, meanwhile at the difference of Overbeck’s attack, our
attack is not structural but completely generic and depends only on code parameters.
7.2 Cryptanalysis of some proposed parameters in rank metric
In the following we apply our method on different reparation of GPT cryptosystem. Since the Basis
enumeration and the Ourivski-Johansson attack were well known people proposed new variations
which focused on resisting to Overbeck attack, since in general it was rather easy to resist to the Basis
and Coordinate enumeration attacks.
Several approaches have been proposed to resist Overbeck’s attack [16,21,29,30,31], but only two
papers propose published parameters: an approach by Loidreau in [21] and an ’advanced standard
approach’ by Gabidulin, Rashwan and Honory ([29,31]). In the following we show that all the proposed
parameters in these papers are completely broken and can be practically recovered, even in less than
1s sometimes.
In the following we attack the RSD problem for [n, k] codes for an error of rank r, q = 2 and an
extension of size 2m. In the following tables we give the different complexity of the different attack
regarding the code used. Notice that our attacks are not structural attacks since we do not use any
particular structure of the code. In the tables: ’OJ1’ stands for the improved basis enumeration by
Ouriski and Joahsson, ’OJ2’ stands for coordinates enumeration, ’Over’ stands for the complexity of
the Overbeck attack, ’ES’ stands for the complexity of the Error Support attack of Section 3, ’L’
stands for the attack by linearization of section 5 (usually it does not work and hence we put∞r, ’LH’
stands for the complexity of the attack by hybrid linearization when guessing zero coordinates errors
and ’HGb’ is the complexity (usually in time) when one attacks with hybrid solving with Gröbner
basis in our new setting. We did not put the complexity with simple Gröbner basis since it usually
does not finish. All our computations were done with the F4 version of Magma on a double core of a
2GHz INTEL with 8 Go RAM.
We now consider different type of reparation.
• Loidreau reparation [21]
The idea of the reparation is to add sufficiently many columns so that the Overbeck attack does
not work. The author focus on the complexity of the Overbeck attack since there is no difficulty to
resist other attacks since in previous complexity, the length n of the code did not appeared in the
exponential complexity of the attack. The author starts from a [24, 12, 12] Gabidulin code which can
correct 6 errors and proposes two sets of parameters for which he adds 40 random columns or 52
random columns. The following table gives the different complexities for our attacks.
Code parameters (n, k, r,m) OJ1 OJ2 Over ES L LH HGb
(64, 12, 6, 24) 2104 285 280 250 ∞ 248 2 hours
(76, 12, 6, 24) 2104 285 280 249 ∞ 236 < 1 s
For hybrid Gröbner basis attack we add mix multiplied (by a non zero element of GF (q)) columns
and fix 3 coordinates, that we hope to have error coordinate zero. We then construct our algebraic
setting that we solve with Gröbner bases and the F4 algorithm. If the guessing was wrong a failure was
obtained with F4 in an average of 0.13 s, repeating the process in a 4 processor computer permitted
us to retrieve the solution in 2h. We also run the LH attack which in practice had a complexity in 244
field operations, we run the attack in Magma and overall the HGb attack was far more efficient and
faster than the attack with Gröbner bases. Our attacks show that all parameters sets proposed in [21]
are completely broken, the second set of parameters which was supposed to be stronger than the first
one can in fact by attacked in a few seconds with hybrid Gröbner bases attack.
• Cryptanalysis of Gabidulin et al. reparations [29,31]
In [29] and [31], Gabidulin et al. propose an approach and parameters (claimed with security 280) to
resist Overbeck’s attack, the approach called ’advanced approach for standard variant’ proceeds by
hiding as usual the generator matrix G with a matrix M with a special form, overall the proposed
parameters can be attacked directly in decoding an error e of rank r in a [n, k] code over GF (2m).
We give in the following table the different parameters proposed and the complexity , the two first
parameters are from [29] and the two last ones are from [31] corresponding to a public key of size
4000b.
Code parameters (n, k, r,m) Over ES L LH HGb
(28, 14, 3, 28) 280 255 ∞ 249 2 days
(28, 14, 4, 28) 280 270 ∞ 265 not finished
(20, 10, 4, 20) 280 256 ∞ 251 5 days
(20, 12, 4, 20) 280 260 ∞ 260 not finished
Experimental results show that it was possible to recover the message in 2 and 5 days with an hybrid
Gröbner bases attack for the first and third set of parameters. In particular it shows that parameters
proposed in [31] with a public key of 4000b are clearly unsafe. For the second and fourth case the
computation could not finish with hybrid Gröbner bases meanwhile the hybrid linearization attack
(without Gröbner bases) gives attack complexities of order 260 which implies that these parameters
can also be considered broken. Practical computation were done which shows that in practice the time
estimation of the complexity followed these complexities.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we propose two new generic approaches to attack the RSD problem, both approaches have
their own interest depending of the type of parameters considered. The first approach is combinatorial
and improves considerably previous attacks and in particular permits to take account of the length of
the code, which not the case previously. We also propose a new algebraic setting based on q-polynomials
which permits to preserve the mathematical structure over the extension field, which is not the case
in previous algebraic setting. At last we break all published parameters proposed to repair the GPT
cryptosystem after Overbeck’s attack. In practice the algebraic attacks do not work necessarily for all
type of parameters but these attacks were more efficient than the first generic combinatorial attack
on the parameters we attacked. The RSD problem seems still promising but still more work has to be
done like for Hamming distance in order to have a clear view of the computational complexity of the
problem. A future direction of work is to consider other type of cryptosystem, moreover it is an open
question to try to generalize our combinatorial approach in order to apply the same type of ideas than
for codes with Hamming distance [1,23,4,14].
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